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Scalable Security Mechanisms for the Internet
Abstract
The design principle of restricting local autonomy only where necessary for global robustness has led to a
scalable Internet. Unfortunately, this scalability and capacity for distributed control has not been achieved
in the mechanisms for specifying and enforcing security policies. The STRONGMAN system described in
this paper demonstrates three new approaches to providing efficient local policy enforcement complying
with global security policies. First is the use of a compliance checker to provide great local autonomy
within the constraints of a global security policy. Second is a mechanism to compose policy rules into a
coherent enforceable set, e.g., at the boundaries of two locally autonomous application domains. Third is
the "lazy instantiation" of policies to reduce the amount of state enforcement points need to maintain. We
demonstrate the use of these approaches in the design, implementation and measurements of a
distributed firewall.
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Abstract
The design principle of restricting local autonomy
only where necessary for global robustness has led

tributed firewall.

1 Introduction

to a scalable Internet. Unfort~nately,this scalabil- ~~~h of the

scalability has heen achieved

ity and capacity for distributed control has not been as a byproduct of intelligent application of the endachieved in the mechanisms for specifying and en- to-end design principle[l7, 71, where properties that
forcing security policies.

must hold end-to-end are provided by mechanisms

The STRONGMAN system described in this pa- at the end points. The resulting design keeps the netper demonstrates three new approaches to providing work simple and allows great local autonomy in imefficient local policy enforcement complying with plementing these mechanisms.
global security policies. First is the use of a compli-

Security for distributed applications is arguably an

ance checker to provide great local autonomy within end-to-end property. By the end-to-end argument
the constraints of a global security policy. second is hosts should be responsible for the perceived security
a mechanism to compose policy rules into a coher- of "the internet". However, several factors currently
ent enforceable set, e.g., at the boundaries of two 10- argue against this placement of functionality. First,
cally autonomous application domains. Third is the policies are, or ought to be, specified at the granu"lazy instantiation" of policies to reduce the amount larity of administrative (security) domains, and not
of state enforcement points need to maintain.

only at the granularity of individual hosts - there

We demonstrate the use of these approaches in the must be means of ensuring that the local enforcedesign, implementation and measurements of a dis- ment actually conforms to the larger ("global") pol-
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tomatic techniques relying on a single method of
specification are desirable. The Distributed Firewall
of [2, 141 implements just such a mechanism.

Figure 1 : A firewall's bottleneck topology.

However, based on experience, no single mechanism exists that can address the security require-

icy. Second, some operating systems have been de- n~entsof all applications and ~rotocols. 'lleresigned under the assumption that network security is fore multiple security mchanisms (with overlapping
mostly handled by third parties (firewalls), thus lack- scopes, such as IPSec and SSL) are in use sh-~ultaing much-needed enforcement mechanisms. Third, neously in many networks. These multiple security
many security policies grant more rights to ''loca]''

mechanisms must present a single consistent system

machines and entities - an irresponsible, incompe- image to the administrator else complexity of configtent, or merely uninformed, coworker can compro- uration will again result in errors.
mise an entire LAN.

It may seem natural to repeat the solution adopted

This situation has led, for example, to the perva- by Distributed Firewalls and design a "universal"
sive use of firewalls, which enforce a single secu- high-level policy specification language.

Such a

rity policy at network boundaries to protect multiple language would, ideally, specify global policies
hosts behind the boundaries from certain classes of which much be enforced across multiple heterogesecurity problems. To implement the policy globally, neous domains. However, security policies are often
the network topology must be restricted to pass all application-dependent. "Universal" high-level poltraffic through the firewall, as shown in Figure l . Un- icy languages are feature-rich and complex, and are
fortunately, these firewalls have many negative con- therefore clumsy and lead to mistakes. Further, such
sequences for Internet routing, flow control and per- languages often presume homogeneity, and cannot

handle mixtures of multiple mechanisms/languages ministrators should be able to independently specify
for different parts of the same network.

policies over their own domain: this should be true

Therefore we argue that the correct approach is whether the administrator manages particular applian architecture that ties together multiple security cations within a security domain, or manages a submechanisms within a single system image, that sup- domain of a larger administrative domain.
ports many application-specific policy languages,

Other concerns in addition to scalability shape the

that automatically distributes and uniformly enforces requirements of STRONGMAN.
the single security policy across all enforcement

Users/principals must be identifiable by (possibly

points, and that allows enforcement points to be cho- multiple) pure names, such as their public key, and
sen to appropriately to meet both security and perfor- not simply by userid and/or IP-address.The
mance requirements. Further, this architecture must policy system must support privilege delegation and
scale with the growth of the Internet.

hierarchical management. Security must not be com-

In this paper we propose an architecture, promised by enforcement points crashing and recovSTRONGMAN, and argue that it meets these re- ering.
quirements.

Given the requirements above, several properties
of STRONGMAN follow immediately:

2 Our Approach

The low-level policy system supports "lazy instantiation" of policy on the enforcement points

A scalable security system for the Internet must
handle growth in the number of users, enforcement
points, and rules pertaining to both, as well as an
ability to support a variety of applications and protocols. Policy updates must be as cheap as possible,
since these are common and often-used operations
in any system (addinglgiving privileges to a user, removing/revoking privileges from a user). Security
policies for a particular application should be spec-

in order to minimize the resources consumed by
policy storage. In other words, an enforcement
point should only learn those parts of its policy
that it actually has to enforce as a result of user
service access patterns. A further benefit of this
approach is that policy may be treated as "soft
state," and thus be discarded by the enforcement
point when resources are running low and recovered when space permits or after a crash.

ified in an application-specific language, and a single specification should be able to control the behav-

STRONGMAN shifts as much of the opera-

ior of any needed security mechanism. Finally, ad-

tional burden as possible to the end users' sys-
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Figure 2: KeyNoteused as a policy interoperability layer. Policy compositionin STRONGMAN does not depend
on using the same compiler to process all the high-level policies.

tems because enforcement points are generally

is used as a common "policy interoperability

overloaded with processing requests and medi-

layer7' (as shown in Figure 2) allows us to use

ating access. As an example, in the context of

the same policy model across different applica-

"lazy policy instantiation" described above, the

tions, without mandating the use of any partic-

users' systems can be made responsible for ac-

ular policy front-end. This architecture has an

quiring the policies that apply to the users and

intentional resemblance to the IP "hourglass",

for providing these to the enforcement points.

and resolves heterogeneity in similar ways, e.g.,
the mapping of the interoperability layer onto

There is a distinction between high and low

a particular enforcement device, or the servic-

level policy in our system; in particular, there

ing of multiple applications with a policy lingua

may be multiple high-level policy specifica-

franca.

tion mechanisms (different languages, GUIs,
etc.), all translating to the same lower-level pol-

The system must be able to compose the inde-

icy expression language.

A powerful, flexi-

pendent policy specifications in a manner which

ble, and extensible low-level mechanism that

does not violate any of them because multiple

independently specified policies may be man- plements these design principles by using the
aged at a single enforcement point.
a

Users will be identified by their public keys

KeyNote [4] trust-management system as a basis for
expressing and distributing low-level security policy.

(each user may have multiple keys, for different purposes/applications). These public keys
are used in the context of various protocols to
authenticate the users to specific services. This 2.1

KeyNote

also helps prevent malicious users from tampering with policies provided to enforcement
points via "lazy policy instantiation".
a

KeyNote is a simple trust management system and
language developed to support a variety of applica-

The low-level policy system allows for decen- tions. Although it is beyond the scope of this paper
tralized and hierarchical management and sup- to give a complete tutorial or reference on KeyNote
ports privilege delegation to other users. Note syntax and semantics (for which the reader is rethat delegation allows any user to be treated ferred to [41 ), we review a few basic concepts to
as an ''administrator'' of her &legatees; con- give the reader a taste of what is going on.
versely, administrators in such a system can
simply be viewed as users with very broad privileges. This permits both decentralized manage-

The basic service provided by the KeyNote system
is compliance checking; that is, checking whether a
proposed action conforms to local policy. Actions in
-

ment (different administrators/users are made
responsible for delegating and potentially refining different sets of privileges), and collaborative networking (by treating the remote administrator as a local user with specific privileges she can then delegate to her users). Lim-

~

KeyNote are specified as a set of name-value pairs,
called an Action Attribute Set. Policies are written
in the KeyNote assertion language and either accept
or reject action attribute sets presented to it. Policies can be broken up and distributed via credentials, which are signed
assertions that can be sent
-

ited privileges can be conferred to administra-

over a network and to which a local policy can defer
tors of other domains, who can then delegate .
in making its decisions. The credential mechanism
these to their users appropriately; this allows for
allows for complex graphs of trust, in which credenIntranet-style collaborations.
tials signed by several entities are considered when
Our architecture, named STRONGMAN, im- authorizing actions.

permit KEY1 if using strong encryption and target in 192.168.1.0/24
permit USERGROUP4 if using authentication and origin in LOCALNET and \
target in WEBSERVERS

Figure 3: A high-level IPsec policy

allow USERGROUP5 if file "/foo/bar.htmlU
allow ANGELOS if directory "/confidential"and source in LOCALNETWORK

Figure 4: A high-level web access policy

2.2 Policy Translation and Composition
In our architecture, policy for different network applications can be expressed in various high-level policy languages or systems, each fine-tuned to the particular application. Each such language is processed

This decoupling of high and low level policy specification permits a more modular and extensible approach, since languages may be replaced, modified,
or new ones added without affecting the underlying
system.

TOOperate in our architecture, each high-level Iancompiler that can take into considerby a
ation such infomation as network topology or a user &age or GUI has to include a "referral" primitive;
database and produces a set of KeyNote credentials. this is simply a reference to a decision made by anAt the absolute minimum, such a compiler would other IanguageJenforcement point (typically lower in
need a knowledge of the public keys identifying the the protocol stack). This primitive allows us to perusers in the system. Other infomation is necessary form policy composition at enforcement time; deon a per-application basis. For example, knowledge cisions made b~ one enforcement mechanism (e-g.9
of the network topology is typically useful in speci- IPsec) are made available to higher-level enforcefying packel filtering policy; for web content access ment mechanisms and can be taken into consideracontrol, on the other hand, the web servers' contents tion when making an access
and layout is probably more useful. Our proof-ofconcept languages (examples are shown in Figures 3

this is

An

in Figure 5.

To complete the composition discussion, all that

and 4) use a template-based mechanism for generat- is necessary is a channel to propagate this inforing KeyNote credentials.

mation across enforcement layers. In our system,

this is done on a case-by-case basis.

For exam- lishes cryptographic context with the remote firewall

ple, IPsec information can be propagated higher in or end system. It is also possible to pass KeyNote
the protocol stack by suitably modifying the Unix credentials in the TLS protocol. For protocols where
getsockopt ( 2 ) system call; in the case of a web this is not possible (e.g.,SSL), an out-of-band mechserver and SSL, the information is readily available anism can be used instead. We have used a simple
through the SSL data structures (since the SSL and web server script interface for submitting credentials
the web access control enforcement are both done in to be considered in the context of an access conthe context of a single process address space).

trol decision; credentials are passed as arguments to
a CGI script that makes them available to the web

2.3 Credential Management

server access control mechanism. To avoid DoS attacks, entries submitted in this manner are periodi-

Compiled credentials are made available to end-users
cally purged (in an LRU manner).
through policy repositories. These credentials are
signed by the administrator's key and contain the various conditions under which a specific user (as identified by her key in the credential) is allowed to access a service. The translation of the policy rule in
Figure 5 is shown in Figure 6.
Users who wish to gain access to some service
first need to acquire a fresh credential from one
of the repositories.

It is not necessary to protect

the credentials as they are transferred over the network, since they are self-protected by virtue of being
signed1. Users then provide these credentials to the
relevant service (web server, firewall, etc.) through
a protocol-specific mechanism. For example, in the
case of IPsec, these credentials are passed on to the
local key management daemon which then estab'1t

is possible to provide credential-confidentiality by en-

Since policy is expressed is terms of credentials
issued to users, policy need not be distributed synchronously to the enforcement points. Enforcement
points need not know of all the users or rules that
pertain to those users at all times; rather, they learn
these rules as users try to gain access to controlled
resources. We call this property "lazy policy instantiation". This allows our system to scale well with
the number of users, rules, and enforcement points.
Enforcement points may treat credentials as soft state
and thus discard them as soon as storage resources
become scarce. Users will simply have to re-submit
these with their next access.
Adding a new user or granting more privileges to
an existing user is simply a matter of issuing a new
credential (note that both operations are equivalent).

crypting each credential with the public key of the intended

The inverse operation, removing a user or revoking

recipient.

issued privilege, can be more expensive: in the sim-

allow USER-ROOT if directory "/confidentialN\
and source in LOCALNETWORK \
and (application IPsec says "strong encryption" or \
application SSL says "very strong encryption")

Figure 5: Web access policy taking into consideration decisions made by the IPsec and SSL protocols. The
information on USER-ROOT and LOCALNETWORK are specified in separate databases, which the compiler
takes into consideration when compiling these rules to KeyNote credentials.

ple case, a user's credentials can be allowed to ex- should not increase the load or storage requirements
pire; this permits a window of access, between the on enforcement points. Thus, the most attractive aptime the decision is taken to revoke a user's privi- proach is proofs of validity (acquired by the user
leges and the time the relevant credentials expire. For from a "refresher" server, and provided to the enthose cases where this is adequate, there is no addi- forcement point along with the credentials). While
tional overhead. This argues for relatively short-lived this approach is architecturally attractive, it places
credentials, which the users (rather, software on their high load on the refresher servers.

The validity

systems) will have to re-acquire periodically. While verification mechanism may be specified on a perthis may place additional burden on the reposito- credential basis, depending on the perceived risk of
ries, it is possible to arrange for credentials to expire compromise and the potential damage done if that
at different times from each other, thus mitigating occurs.
the effect on the infrastructure of multiple users (re-

Finally, since KeyNote allows arbitrary levels of

)acquiring their credentials at the same time. Given delegation (through chains of credentials), it is pasthat a large number of digital signatures will have t~ sible for users to act as lower-level administrators
be computed as a result of periodically issuing ere- and issue credentials to others. It is thus possible
dentials, this is desirable from a policy-generation to build a hierarchical and decentralized managepoint of view as well.

ment scheme, wherein the corporate network admin-

For more aggressive credential revocation, other istrator authorizes branch administrators to manage
mechanisms have to be used. Although no single their networks under some constraints. More interrevocation mechanism exists that can be used in all estingly, it is possible to view the administrator of
possible systems, we note that any such mechanism another network as a local user; that administrator

may then handle access to the shared resources for connect to the h t t p port on a company's internal
the remote network users, under the constraints spec- Web server is only granted to those machines havified in their credential.

ing the appropriate credentials, rather than those machines that happen to be connected to an internal

3 The Distr:ibutedFirewall

wire.
In our prototype, end hosts (as identified by their

We present a distributed firewall as an example of an IP address) are also considered principals when IPsec
implementation conforming to the STRONGMAN is not used to secure communications. This allows
architecture.

local policies or credentials issued by administrators

A distributed firewall (as described in [2, 141 ) en- to specify policies similar to Current packet-filtering
forces a single central security policy at every end- rules. Naturally, such policies or credentials implic-

point. The policy specifies what connectivity, both itly trust the validity of an IP address as an identifier.
inbound and outbound, is permitted. This policy is In that respect, they are equivalent to standard ~ a c k e t
distributed to all endpoints where it is authenticated filtering. The only known solution to this is the use of
and then enforced, thus making security an end-to- ~ ' ~ ~ t o g r a~rotocols
~ h i c to cure ~~t~-~munications.
end property.
Distributed firewalls do not rely on the topological

3.1 Implementation

notions of "inside" and "outside" as do traditional Our system (implemented on the OpenBSD operatfirewalls. Rather, a distributed firewall grants spe- ing system) is comprised of three components: (1)
cific rights to machines that possess the credentials a set of kernel extensions, which implement the enspecified by the central policy. A laptop connected forcement mechanisms; (2) a user level daemon proto the "outside" Internet has the same level of protec- cess, which implements the distributed firewall polition as does a desktop in the organization's facility. cies; and (3) a device driver, which is used for twoConversely, a laptop connected to the corporate net way communication between the kernel and the polby a visitor would not have the proper credentials, icy daemon. Our prototype implementation totals apand hence would be denied access, even though it is proximately 1 150 lines of C code; each component is
topologically "inside."
In the example STRONGMAN distributed fire-

roughly the same size.
Figure 7 shows a graphical representation of the

wall, endpoints are characterized by their public keys system, with all its components. The core of the
and the credentials they possess. Thus, the right to enforcement mechanism lives in kernel space and is

Authorizer: ADMINISTRATOR-KEY
Licensees: USER-ROOT-KEY
Conditions: app-domain == "web access"

&&

directory "= "/directory/.*"&&
(source-address =< "192.168.001.255" &&
source-address >= "192.168.001.000")&&
(ipsec-result == "strong encryption"

I/

ssl-result == "very strong encryption") -> "permit";
Signature:

...

Figure 6: Translation of the policy rule from Figure 5 to a KeyNote credential. The public keys and the digital
signature are omitted in the interests of readability.
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openO, closeO,
read(), write(),
ioctl()

f

f

User Space

match, a request is generated and inserted in the policy context queue. From there, via the device driver,

the policy daemon can get the request and respond
accordingly.
In the following three subsections we describe the

--

various parts of the architecture, their functionality,

,

and how they interact with each other.

Kernel Space

..-...-..-............................................
3.1.1

Kernel Extensions

Network
In the UNIX operating system users create outgoFigure 7: Block diagram of the firewall system

ing and allow incoming connections using a number
of provided system calls. Since any user has access

comprised of the filtering routines and the rule cache. to these system calls, some "filtering" mechanism is
The policy specification and processing unit lives in needed. This filtering should be based on a policy
user space inside the policy daemon process. Any that is set by the administrator, and any incoming or
incoming or outgoing IP packets go through the fil- outgoing packet should be subject to it.
ter and are subject to the rules. If none of the rules

In order to enforce our policy to every packet and

yet have a simple and elegant design, we decided
to filter IP traffic. To achieve this we added hooks
in the ip-input( ) and ip-output( ) routines of
the protocol stack that will execute our filtering code,
and created two data structures to assist us in this

u-int32-t
seq;
Numberk/
- /*Sequence
u-int32-t uid;
u-int32-t N;

/*User Idk/
/*Number of Fields*/

u-int32-t 1[Nl;

char

/*Field Lengths*/

*field [Nl ;

/*Fields*/

process.
The first data structure, or rules cache, contains a

Figure 8: Policy context data structure

set of rules that packets are compared against. If a
match is found, the rule is followed to either accept decision-making strategyor drop the packet. The second data structure is the

Every packet is intercepted at the IP layer and

policy context queue. A policy context (the C decla- checked against the rules cache. If a match is found

ration for which is shown in Figure 8) is a container then the rule is enforced. If no match is found, we
for all the information related to a specific packet. enqueue a new request to the policy context queueWe associate a sequence number to each such con- If We have already enqueued a request for the same
text and then we start filling it with all the infoma- class of packets, no further action is necessary. Each
tion the policy daemon will need to make an access entT in the context queue also contains the last
control decision. A request to the policy daemon is packet from that packet flow; if a positive decision
comprised of the following fields: a sequence num- is received from the policy daemon, the packet is reber uniquely identifying the request, the ID of the queued for processing by the IP stack.
user the connection request belongs to, the number

In the next section we discuss how messages are

of information fields that will be included in the re- passed between the k m ~ e and
l the policy daemon.
quest, the lengths of those fields, and finally the fields
themselves. This can include source and destination

3.1.2 Policy Device

addresses, transport protocol and ports, etc. Any cre- To maximize the flexibility of our system and aldentials acquired through IPsec may also be added low for easy experimentation, we decided to make
to the context at this stage. There is no limit as to the policy daemon a user level process. To support
the kind or amount of information we can associate this architecture, we implemented a pseudo device
with acontext. We can, for example, include the time driver, /dev/policy,that serves as a communiof day or the number of other open connections of cation path between the user-space policy daemon,
that user, if we want them to be considered by our and the modified system calls in the kernel. Our de-

vice driver, implemented as a loadable module, sup-

I

I

I

ports the usual operations (open ( 2 ) , c l o s e ( 2 ) ,
r e a d ( 2 ) , w r i t e ( 2 ) , a n di o c t l ( 2 ) ) .
If no policy daemon has opened / d e v / p o l i c y ,
no connection filtering is done. Opening the device

5 1.8 ms

Warm cache
I

IPF

63.1 ms

activates the distributed firewall and initializes data
structures. All subsequent flow of packets will go
through the procedure described in the previous sec-

Figure 9: Average connection overhead measured in
ms for 100 TCP connections between Alice and Bob.

tion. Closing the device will free any allocated resources and disable the distributed firewall.
The policy daemon reads the device for pending
requests in the policy context queue. It then handles daemon can simply flush one or more entries from
the request and returns a new rule to the kernel by the rules cache in the kernel. This way subsequent
writing it to the device, as a result of which the ap- packets will not match the existing rule set and the

propriate entry is entered in the rules cache.

policy daemon will be queried for the new policy.

The i o c t l ( 2 ) call is used for "house-keeping"
tasks. This allows the kernel and the policy daemon

~ h daemon
,
receives each request (see Figure 8)
to re-synchronize in case of any errors in creating or from the kernel by reading the
icy device. The
parsing the request
tries from the rule cache.

and to

flush en- request contains all the information relevant to that
connection as described in Section 3.1.1. Processing of the request is done by the daemon using the

3.1.3 Policy Daemon

KeyNote system, and a decision to accept or deny

The last component of our system is the policy dae- it is reached. The decision is sent to the kernel,
mon. It is a user-level process responsible for mak- and the daemon waits for the next request. While
ing decisions, based on policies that are specified the information received in a particular message is
by some administrator and credentials retrieved re- application-dependent (in our case, relevant to the
motely or provided by the kernel, on whether to al- distributed firewall), the daemon itself has no awarelow or deny connections.

ness of the specific application. Thus, it can be used

Policies are initially read in from a file. Addition to provide policy resolution services for many differand removal policies can be done dynamically. The ent applications, literally without any modifications.

3.2 Experimental Evaluation
Insecure

0.273 f 0.091 ms

While the architectural discussion is largely qual-

Cold cache

0.283 k 0.089 ms

itative, some estimates of the system performance

Warm cache

0.282 f 0.077 ms

are useful. We performed several experiments, both

IPF

0.283 & 0.124 ms

of comparable node software (using IPF, a packetfiltering package implemented completely inside the Figure 10: Average roundtrip time (in ms) for 200
kernel, used in many open-source systems) and of ICMP ECHO-REQUEST messages.
varied topologies which demonstrate the value of
I

I

1

maintaining consistent global security properties.
Our test machines are x86 architecture machines
running OpenBSD 2.8 and interconnected by 100
Mbps ethernet. More specifically, in the two-host
tests (source to sink), Alice is an 850 Mhz PI11 and
serves as the source. Bob, the sink, runs the distributed firewall (DF) code and is a 400 Mhz PII.

Figure 1 1: lOOMB file transfer over TCP, measured in
ms.

In the following tables, insecure means there is shown in Figure 10. We include the standard devineither DF nor IPF running, IPF n~eanswe have IPF ation, as the measurements did vary slightly. These
activated, cold cache means that we have DF running two experiments show us that the cost of compliance
but the rules cache is empty and every time we go to checking in our architecture is very small (within
the daemon to get the rules. Wiarm cache means that 3% of an insecure system, except for the TCP cold
the rules are in the cache (except for the first refer- cache case which is 20% more expensive), and typience).

cally better than IPF. This means that an architecture

In Figure 9 we have a server application running with decentralized enforcement does not unduly afon Alice; Bob runs a client which connects to the fect end-system latency.
server 100 times using different ports. This generates

The measurements of Figure 1 1 have a server ap-

200 rules (for incoming and outgoing packets). In the plication is running on Alice; a client running on Bob
IPF case, those 200 rules are pre-loaded in the filter connects to Alice and transfers 100MB. It is clear
list. In the second experiment, Bob sent 200 ICMP that our system does not significantly affect network
ECHO-REQUEST messages to Alice; the results are throughput (the difference is in the order of 0.5%).

.

Sende

n

,. Host

Policy

Firewall

ning the distributed firewall and enforcing policy locally (see Figure 14). The ethernet hub is connected
directly to the outside world; the rest of the configuration remains as in the previous experiment. To test
the scalability of the distributed firewall we varied
the number of hosts that participate in the connection
setup. As in the previous experiment we formed 100
connections to the machines running the distributed
firewall in a round robin fashion, each time varying

Figure 12: Test topology with intermediate firewall.

the number of participating hosts. We make the assumption that every protected host inside a firewall
contributes roughly the same number of rules, and
in the classic centralized case the firewall will have
to enforce the sum of those rules. Therefore indi-

Figure 13: Average connection overhead measured in
ms for 100 TCP connections between hosts through a
firewall.

vidual machines will have a smaller rule base than
a central control point. The measurements and the
percentile overheads are given in Figures 15 and 16.
We have kept the total number of rules constant as

In the experiment of Figure 12, we used a configu- in the IPF case, and spread them over an increasration of 4 systems (300 MHz PII) interconnected via ing mmber of machines. This experiment clearly
a lOOMbps ethernet hub. One of the four machines demonstrates the benefit of eliminating intermediate
is connected to the "outside world" with 100 Mbps enforcement points, and pushing ~ecurityfunctions

ethernet. In the outside world there is an 850 MHz to the endpoints: a two-fold impro~ementin performachine (Alice). The "inside" 3 machines run a sim- mance conpared to the centralized approach, in addip]e server accepting connections. The outside ma- tion to the increased flexibility and scalability offered
chine, through the gateway, makes 100 connections by our architecture.
in a round robin fashion to the 3 machines. Measurements are given in the table of Figure 13.

1, the IPF firewall experiments, the rules must be
preloaded; in an experimental configuration such as

Using the same end-hosts, we eliminate the gate- we described (with ca. 200 rules) this is a nonway machine. with each of the client machines run- issue. In large installations however, the number of

rules can easily reach 4,000 - 5,000 (e.g., for a financial institution we are familiar with). In an environment where simple IP address checking is in-

_.-.

,,

,

.

sufficient, each such rule has other information associated with it (e.g., user public keys, acceptable en-

. --..

',.

cryptionlauthentication algorithms, other conditions

.

for access). Thus, the storage requirements for network layer security policy would vary from 4MB to
lOOMB or more. This requirement would be imposed on all enforcement points of the same network,
which would then be required to have persistent stor-

Figure 14: Test topology without intermediate firewall.

age (so the policy survives crashes or power cycling).
1 Host

1 2 Hosts

3 Hosts

Insecure

56.1 ms

53.1 ms

48.6 ms

Cold cache

84.3 ms

62.1 ms

53.7 ms

Warm cache

66.3 ms

58.0 ms

50.5 ms

The key observation here is that not all users can (or
do) access the same enforcement points at the same
time; our architecture takes advantage of this fact, by
only instantiating rules as-needed at an enforcement
point. The rules are limited in our system to those

needed to grant access to users actually requesting Figure 15: Average connection overhead measured in
access.

ms for 100 TCP connections spread over one, two and
three hosts respectively, using the distributed firewall.

4

Related Work

Traditional firewall work [6, 15, 81 has focused on
nodes and enforcement mechanisms rather than overall network protection and policy coordination.
ln OASIS[] 11, policy coordination is achieved Figure 16: Reduction of processing overhead of the

with a role-based system where each principal may distributed firewall as the number of hosts increases.
be issued with a name by one service, on the condi- The percentages represent the additional cost of the
tion that it has already been issued with some spec- distributed firewall over the insecure case and are deified name of another service. Event notification is rived from Figure 15.

used to revoke names when the issuing conditions itly defined by the security administrator of a system,
are not satisfied, thus revoking access to services that and is separate from access policy.
depended on that name. Credentials are limited to
verifying membership to a group or role, and OA~

-

-

In [ 5 ] , the authors propose an algebra of secu-

-

SIS uses delegation in a very limited way, limiting
decentralization.
Firmato's[ 1] "network grouping" language is locally customized to each managed firewall. The language is portable, but limited to packet filtering. It
does not handle delegation or different, interacting
application domains. Policy updates force complete
reloads of the rulesets at the affected enforcement
points, and the entire relevant policy ruleset must be
available at an enforcement point. This causes scaling problems with respect to the number of users,
peer nodes, and policy entries.

rity policies that allows combination of authorization
policies specified in different languages and issued
by different authorities. The main disadvantage of
their approach is that it assumes that all policies and
(more importantly) all necessary supporting information is available at a single decision point, which
is a difficult proposition even within the bounds of an
operating system. Our observation here is that in fact
the decision made by a policy engine can be cached
and reused higher in the stack. Although the authors
briefly discuss partial evaluation of composition policies, they do so only in the context of their generation
and not on enforcement.

A similar system in [12] covers additional configuration domains (such as 00s). Differences are the

The NESTOR architecture [3] defines a frame-

policy description language and the method by which work for automated configuration of networks and
the rule set is pruned for any particular device. Con- their components.
siderable work of this style has been done [9, 161.

NESTOR uses a set of tools

for managing a network topology database.

It

Another approach to policy coordination 11Ol pro- then translates high-level network configuration diposes a ticket-based architecture using mediators to rectives into device-specific commands through an
coordinate policy between different information en- adaptation layer. Policy constraints are described
claves. Policy relevant to an object is retrieved by a in a Java-like language and are enforced by dedicentral repository by the controlling mediator. Me- cated manager processes, which pose scaling probdiators also map foreign principals to local entities, lems. We believe this approach has difficulty with
assign local proxies to act as trusted delegates of decentralized administration and separation-of-duty
foreign principals, and perform other authorization- concerns, due to its view of the network through a
related duties. Coordination policy has to be explic- central configuration depository.

5

Concluding Remarks

uation on real traffic, and extending the uses of

out system with new application-specific policy lanSTRONGMAN is a new security policy management guages.
architecture. Its approach to scaling is local enforcement of global security policies. The local autonomy
provided by compliance checking permits the architecture to scale comfortably with the Internet infras-
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